Philipe Figueiredo, VP of Global Business Development – JSSI Parts and Leasing, recently spoke with D.O.M. Magazine about aircraft part quality assurance and maintaining operational and regulatory compliance. 

Read the full article in D.O.M. Magazine’s September 2025 issue. (Pg. 48-50)

–

Background

Aviation safety depends fundamentally on the reliability and integrity of every component that goes into an aircraft. In an industry where failure is not an option, the certification and approval of aircraft parts represents one of the most critical aspects of maintaining operational safety and regulatory compliance. Suspected unapproved parts (SUP) can be a concern in the context of the ongoing challenge of maintaining supply chain integrity in an increasingly globalized and cost-conscious aviation industry. Understanding the nature of SUPs, their potential pathways into the aviation supply chain, and the comprehensive systems designed to detect and prevent their installation has become essential knowledge for all stakeholders in the aviation maintenance and supply ecosystem.

Defining SUPs

Philipe comments: “An SUP is any aircraft part that lacks the required certification, approval, or traceability. Unlike counterfeit components, which are deliberately falsified, or lower-quality components, which may simply not meet quality standards, SUP components are of concern because their origin or compliance status is unknown or poorly documented,” he says. “These components could infiltrate the aviation supply chain through unauthorized resellers, unregulated disassembly, or incomplete documentation.”

FAA’s SUP Program – Introduced in 1995

Engines, aircraft, and aircraft systems are equipped with original components, many of which must be overhauled or replaced at specific intervals, the FAA notes in the article. “Component manufacturers must submit a design package to the FAA demonstrating that their component is of equal or superior quality to the original. If accepted, we will issue a parts manufacturing approval (PMA). This means that the company’s component is an FAA approved component. However, some companies manufacture components without going through the PMA process to avoid the time and expense of the process and the uncertainty of whether we will accept a component of equal or superior quality to the original,” the FAA says. “To address this issue, in 1995 we developed a formal ‘suspected unapproved component’ (SUP) program. A key element of this program is to ensure that suppliers and maintenance facilities are aware of the possibility of unapproved components entering the system and have a system in place to report and report them.” PMA lists are maintained in the FAA’s Dynamic Regulatory System (DRS), where one can search for PMAs by PMA holder, PMA item name, number, approval basis, and the make and model on which the PMA component can be installed, the FAA explains.

Risk Mitigation:

• Maintenance teams and technicians are trained to report warning signs such as missing or suspicious documentation, mismatched or incorrect part numbers, unusual provenance, or physical signs of wear inconsistent with the component’s history, Figueiredo affirms. “When a suspected SUP is reported, the FAA initiates an investigation that may include document audits, inspections, and supply chain tracking. Aviation companies play a critical role in maintaining records and ensuring traceability.”
• The FAA has a comprehensive guide on how suppliers and maintenance facilities can prevent the installation of unapproved components. “We encourage those who supply components (suppliers) and work on aeroplanes (maintenance and repair facilities) to have systems in place to detect and report SUPs. They should also have procedures in place for reporting SUPs. When we receive a report, we are committed to determining whether it is indeed an unapproved problem,” the FAA says. “We will review the documentation and may visit the location where it was sold or installed. If we determine that it is unapproved, we will verify how many aircraft they are on and whether operators have encountered problems with the component. We will then notify aircraft owners, operators, manufacturers, maintenance organizations, component suppliers, and distributors. We may fine manufacturers of unapproved components and notify the US Department of Justice of any suspected cases.”
• MROs and operators should source only from approved suppliers, require full traceability, and verify airworthiness documentation, such as FAA Form 8130-3. “Maintaining a detailed component history and leveraging reliable databases and internal controls is essential to ensuring compliance throughout the component’s operational lifecycle. The FAA recommends periodic SUP awareness training, as outlined in AC 21-29D. Industry organizations and MROs also offer ongoing training through workshops, advisories, and internal programs,” Figueiredo says.